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INTRODUCTION
From President Barack Obama and Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton to The New York Times, the popular perception of
medical apology programs is that they are wonderful things.1
These programs call on doctors who have committed an error to
meet with their injured patient, explain why the mistakes
happened and apologize accordingly. Taken in isolation, the
concept of a doctor admitting his or her unintended error to a
harmed patient seems appropriate, humanitarian, and fair. This
Article explains, however, why their perceived nobility is based
on a myth.2 In reality, the design of medical apology programs
allows for the manipulation of injured patients as a means to
persuade them not to pursue money damages.
A phenomenon called “cooling the mark out” that was first
noted in 1952 by the famed sociologist Erving Goffman, explains
how apology programs work.3 Goffman observed that “confidence
men” use a tried-and-true set of techniques to convince (or “cool
out”) their victim (or “mark”) not to complain after realizing that
he or she had been swindled.4 Goffman wrote that cooling the
mark out also has uses in contexts beyond criminal enterprises.5
When it does happen in law-abiding society, it uses similar
processes in which a person in a position of power uses
persuasive methods to control the emotional state of a mark.6
The intended effect remains to diffuse the mark’s righteous anger
to the con’s benefit.7 This Article argues that medical apology

1 See Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the
Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2207 (2006); Kevin
Sack, Doctors Start to Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Long Before ‘See You in Court,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2008, at A1.
2 The sources on this topic use the terms “disclosure program” and “apology
program” interchangeably. Ultimately, disclosure programs—where a medical provider
simply discloses that an error occurred—do not necessarily have to include an apology.
However, for strategic reasons, doctors are nearly universally counseled to apologize for
acts of negligence at the time of their disclosure. As a reason for doing so, CRICO/RMF
(the insurer that covers physicians at Harvard’s hospitals) explained that the disclosure
should include an apology “because an apology is often equated with the showing of
empathy, a communication that lacks this basic ‘human touch’ may actually make a
situation much worse.” CRICO/RMF, Disclosure and Apology: CRICO’s Perspective,
CRICO/RMF (last visited July 1, 2011), http://www.rmf.harvard.edu/files/documents/
2003WhitePaper--DisclosureApology.pdf [hereinafter CRICO’s Perspective]. For the sake
of ease, this paper will refer to these programs as “apology programs” except in the
context of quotations from other sources that use the term “disclosure” with identical
intention.
3 Erving Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure,
15 PSYCHIATRY 451, 452 (1952).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 455.
6 Id.
7 Id.

Do Not Delete

2011]

11/18/2011 4:38 PM

Medical Apology Programs

309

programs engage in cooling the mark out. The goal of hospitals
that use them is, of course, not to prevent a victim from reporting
a crooked game of dice or three-card monte to the police. Instead,
modern apology programs appear to cool their marks out as a
means of preventing them from speaking to a lawyer and
becoming educated about their legal rights.
This Article unfolds in five parts. Part I presents a brief
history of apology programs, including their genesis as a
calculated attempt to soften the blow from regulatory
requirements that forced physicians and institutions to report
events of malpractice. Part II develops a typology of the different
forms of disclosure programs that have evolved, each of which
has become more efficiently designed to restrict a malpractice
victim’s ability to recover. Part III demonstrates how the current
application of medical apology programs is consistent with
Goffman’s sociological work on cooling the mark out, as well as
psychological research on methods of influencing decisions
through apologies. Part IV of the Article explains how apology
programs create outcomes that are inconsistent with the tort
system by influencing patients to receive less compensation than
the law entitles them. Part V suggests remedies for the problems
created by those who have designed medical apology programs.
I. THE STORY OF DISCLOSURE PROGRAMS
While proponents of apology programs typically claim that
they exist to fulfill an ethical necessity, their creation was far
more practical: they were formed as a response to regulatory
requirements.8 The impetus occurred in 1999, when researchers
at the Institute of Medicine determined that as many as 98,000
Americans die every year as a result of preventable medical
errors.9 Before that time, apology programs were virtually
8 See CRICO’s Perspective, supra note 2, (advocating disclosure because it is the
“right thing to do”);; ECRI Inst., Disclosure of Unanticipated Outcomes, INCIDENT &
REPORTING MGMT. 5, at 2 (Jan. 2008), available at https://www.ecri.org/Documents/
Patient_Safety_Center/HRC_Disclosure_Unanticipated_Events_0108.pdf
(describing
disclosure as “appropriate,” “ethical,” and “the right thing to do”).
9 INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 31 (2000).
Subsequent research indicates this figure just scratches the surface of the amount of
malpractice that actually occurs. For example, one study found that about 15 million
incidents of medical harm—unintended physical injury resulting from medical care—
occur annually in the United States. C. Joseph McCannon et al., Miles to Go: An
Introduction to the 5 Million Lives Campaign, 33 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY &
PATIENT SAFETY 477, 479 (Aug. 2007). A 2011 study funded by the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement found that as many as thirty-three percent of all inpatient stays
involve malpractice. David C. Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’ Shows that Adverse
Events in Hospitals May Be Ten Times Greater than Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH
AFF. 581, 584 (2011). This result is consistent with research results from a federally
sponsored United States Department of Health and Human Services study and may, even
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unheard of in hospitals.10
However, the shocking figures
catalyzed medical regulators to seek ways to improve patient
safety. One effect was that, in 2001, the nation’s largest hospital
accrediting organization, the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations,11 published a new set of patient
safety standards.12
These standards required medical
practitioners to disclose all “unanticipated outcomes,” including
malpractice, to patients.13 The cost for failing to disclose errors
was steep; facilities whose practitioners did not comply could lose
Joint Commission accreditation, effectively putting them out of
business.14
The Joint Commission’s transparency rules caused fear
among physicians, risk managers at hospital facilities and
insurance executives.15 They were concerned that, if patients
learned of acts of malpractice they would not otherwise know
about, they would then have a basis to seek compensation for
their injuries.16
still, underrate the amount of malpractice because it is based only on record review and
experience has proven that “not all adverse events are documented in the patient record.”
Id. at 586.
10 See ROBERT D. TRUOG ET AL., TALKING WITH PATIENTS AND FAMILIES ABOUT
MEDICAL ERROR 52–56 (2011) (explaining the rise of apology programs in the United
States); Nancy Lamo, Disclosure of Medical Errors: The Right Thing to Do, but What is
the Cost?, LOCKTON COS., LLC 2 (Winter 2011), available at http://www.lockton.com/
Resource_/PageResource/MKT/disclosure%20of%20medical%20errors.pdf (describing the
cultural shift from deny-and-defend to disclosure at some healthcare organizations). See
also Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? The
University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 125, 131 (2009) (recounting
shift from “deny and defend” to transparency after medical errors).
11 Formerly referred to as “JCAHO,” this Article will refer to the organization by its
current commonly used moniker, the “Joint Commission.”
12 See JOINT COMM’N, REVISIONS TO JOINT COMMISSION STANDARDS IN SUPPORT OF
PATIENT SAFETY AND MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE ERROR REDUCTION (2001).
13 Id. The American Medical Association articulated a similar position, stating that
a physician is ethically required to inform the patient when faced with “significant
medical complications that may have resulted from the physician’s mistake or judgment.”
AM. MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS
(1997), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/
code-medical-ethics/opinion812.page.
14 The Joint Commission is the nation’s largest hospital accreditor, certifying more
than 19,000 United States medical facilities. About The Joint Commission,
JOINTCOMMISSION.ORG (last visited July 27, 2011), http://www.jointcommission.org/
about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx. Accreditation by the Joint Commission
or other certifying body is a necessary step before a medical provider can receive
payments from Medicare. See 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2010).
15 Ed Lovern, JCAHO’s New Tell-All; Standards Require that Patients Know About
Below-Par Care, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 1, 2001, at 2 (“The challenge, of course, will be
what liabilities [the Joint Commission’s disclosure requirement] may place upon the
hospitals and practitioners” given our litigious society, said Greg Wise, M.D., Vice
President of Medical Integration at 410-bed Kettering (Ohio) Medical Center).
16 See Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National
Survey, 22 HEALTH AFF. 73, 76 (2003) (finding physicians’ primary concern about
disclosing errors is increased litigation); Albert Wu, Handling Hospital Errors: Is
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With these changes hanging over them, the medicalinsurance industry began using its resources to try to protect
itself from being held financially accountable for medical errors.
Industry lobbyists exerted influence on lawmakers to create
special medical apology shield laws: if a patient chooses not to
accept an apology in lieu of money damages, the doctor’s apology
can never be mentioned in court and the doctor can behave as if
he never made the mistake to which he or she admitted.17 With
few legislators or members of the public stopping to ask how
these laws will affect injured patients, medical apology shield
laws have taken hold in thirty-four states and the District of
Columbia.18
The apology shield laws come in a variety of forms. Some
protect a doctor from allowing a jury to learn about only the
apology itself, some protect the doctor from a jury learning that
the doctor has admitted fault, and some protect both.19
Ultimately, however, each of the versions mean that a doctor can
make statements related to malpractice and if the patient still
wishes to pursue money damages in court, the jury would not be
able to learn about it. Financially, they mean that as long as
patients do not ask for money, doctors are willing to take
responsibility; but when a malpractice victim seeks a legal
remedy, the doctor is then free to deny responsibility. As one
commentator noted, the rationale for these types of laws exposes
the motivations of those that push for them:
One might wonder why physicians and hospitals would seek special
protection under the law for being honest with their patients about
errors and mistakes. One obvious answer to this question is money,
in particular insurance company money. Every doctor and hospital in
Massachusetts is insured for damage done by their mistakes. Some
Disclosure the Best Defense, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 970, 971 (1999) (“Full disclosure
could certainly provide an otherwise uninformed patient with a basis for litigation.”).
17 Insurance companies often either employ or foster close ties with lobbyists to sway
court rules in their favor. See, e.g., Affiliations, GALLAGHER HEALTHCARE (July 12, 2011,
8:35 AM), http://www.gallaghermalpractice.com/affiliations-endorsements.aspx (listing
seven lobbyist affiliates); Endorsements, GALLAGHER HEALTHCARE (July 12, 2011, 8:35
AM), http://www.gallaghermalpractice.com/affiliations-endorsements.aspx (listing three
lobbyist groups that endorse Gallagher Healthcare insurance agency); MED. LIABILITY
MUTUAL INS. COMPANY, http://www.mlmic.com/portal (last visited July 12, 2011)
(“MLMIC is a respected voice in the State legislature and advocates on behalf of its
policyholders on liability insurance and tort reform matters.”);; Political Advocacy, THE
DOCTORS COMPANY (July 12, 2011, 8:09 AM), http://www.thedoctors.com/
KnowledgeCenter/PoliticalAdvocacy/index.htm (explaining The Doctors Company’s use of
political action committees to advocate and defend tort reform).
18 Anna C. Mastroianni et al., The Flaws in State ‘Apology’ and ‘Disclosure’ Laws
Dilute Their Intended Impact on Malpractice Suits, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1611, 1612 (2010)
(reporting thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have medical apology shield
laws).
19 Id. at 1611 (describing different forms of apology shield laws).
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insurance companies and risk managers believe, based on studies,
that if there are more apologies and admissions of mistakes by health
care providers, fewer people will pursue their legal rights, and
insurers will have to pay fewer claims. Thus, [apology shield laws]
allow medical providers to apologize and admit mistakes so long as
they do not have to admit those mistakes when it costs their insurer
money. [Apology shield laws] are bad policy, unnecessary and should
not be enacted as they tend to hide the truth from the judicial system,
while giving health care and providers a free pass to “admit” to
mistakes without taking any responsibility for them.20

But apology shield laws are not the only measure hospitals
employ that lessen the potential financial exposure created by
disclosure requirements. More significantly, many insurers and
hospital risk management departments have created protocols
for doctors to make apologies designed to prevent a case from
ever getting to a jury, or even to a lawyer.21
The discovery that apology programs could be financially
beneficial to the average insurer or hospital was serendipitous.
Long before the Joint Commission guidelines changed, the
Department of Veterans Affairs hospital at Lexington, Kentucky
(“Lexington VAMC”) created their own apology program based on
changes to the VA’s internal guidelines.22 In a subsequent study,
data indicated that disclosing errors in specific ways may not
result in an increase in the number of malpractice claims or in
the amount paid per claim.23 Its authors did not take too
seriously the idea that its principles would be welcomed by

20 Benjamin Zimmermann, When Medical Malpractice Occurs, Sorry Seems to be the
Hardest Word, SUGARMAN L. BLOG (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.sugarman.com/blog/2010/
10/when-medical-malpractice-occurs-sorry-seems-to-be-the-hardest-word/.
21 See infra Part II (describing apology programs instituted at hospitals). Even
though many American hospitals are nominally “non-profit,” their risk management
departments are akin to for-profit insurance companies. The job of hospital’s “bottom-line
oriented” risk management team is “to protect the financial assets of the hospital from
claims asserted through the tort system.” Stephan Landsman, The Risk of Risk
Management, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2315, 2316 (2010). A hospital’s risk managers are, by
contractual requirement, in league with the malpractice insurers that represent its
doctors. Their mission is to “oversee the institution’s relationship with those providing
insurance coverage to pay awards made against the hospital for medical malpractice.” Id.
at 2317. In fact, this cooperation is contractually required and, as a result, the “required
cooperation has serious implications for the care provided to patients after they have
suffered injury at the hands of the medical staff. The chief goal shifts from providing
treatment to ‘paying as little money in settlements as possible . . . .’” Id. As a result, it
makes no difference whether the information about apology programs comes from risk
managers in a hospital or from the insurance company itself. Both are focused on legal
liability and money, not the actual provision of medical care.
22 See infra notes 28–33 and accompanying text (discussing the VA’s guidelines for
disclosure of unanticipated medical outcomes).
23 See infra notes 34–41 and accompanying text (discussing the results of a study of
Lexington VAMC disclosure program).
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hospitals outside of the VA system.24 However, once the Joint
Commission ruled, all hospitals subject to their authority had
little choice but to consider it.
Subsequent studies supported the idea that many patients
were willing to accept a fraction of the amount of money they
would get in a malpractice suit if the doctor simply apologized.25
In response, risk managers began to get serious about examining
apology programs much more closely and, once convinced of their
pecuniary benefits, began telling the public that they were a
moral imperative.26
II. REPRESENTATIVE MODELS FOR APOLOGY PROGRAMS
This part of the Article explains the workings of
representative apology programs in the United States. It begins
with a discussion of the Lexington VAMC’s early experience,
which disclosed errors to patients and also took measures to
expressly advise the patient to seek legal counsel for what has
become both a medical and legal issue.
The Lexington VAMC program is important because it is the
precursor to the models of apology programs currently employed
in the United States. It is also perhaps the last widely publicized
program in the United States that included in its published
protocol the need to advise unrepresented patients to seek legal
counsel before confronting them with an apology and a set of
decisions that would have legal consequences for them.
Once the Joint Commission mandated that facilities disclose
acts of malpractice, insurers had no choice but to admit acts of
malpractice. The VA program, having already created a path,
became a model for others, which made subsequent adaptations
to further tilt the process of admitting an act of malpractice in
their financial favor. This sub-section then goes on to explore the
workings of two of these modern programs, the COPIC 3Rs
program and the University of Michigan Health Services
(“UMHS”) model.

24 See Steven S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May
Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 963, 966 (1999), available at
http://www.annals.org/content/131/12/963.full.pdf (“If there is a barrier to the adoption of
a humanistic risk management policy by nongovernmental hospitals, it may be the
involvement of many private malpractice insurers, each of which is interested in paying
as little money as possible. We believe that these insurers would have to be convinced of
the economical benefits of such a policy before they would consider adopting it.”).
25 See infra Part III (discussing how apologies affect victims’ willingness to settle).
26 See infra Part III (discussing psychological effects of apology programs). See also
note 8 (quoting sources regarding ethical necessity of apology programs).
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A. Lexington, Kentucky VA Hospital
Prior to the Joint Commission’s disclosure mandate, only one
study had evaluated the effectiveness of an American medical
malpractice apology program.27 In 1995, the Department of
Veterans Affairs rewrote its policy manual to mandate disclosure
to patients who had suffered an unanticipated outcome.28 In the
event of an unanticipated outcome, the rules required that the
medical center inform the patient and/or the family, as
appropriate, of the event, and assure them that medical
measures have been implemented and that additional steps are
being taken to minimize disability, death, inconvenience, or
financial loss to the patient or family.29
In response, the Lexington VAMC created a protocol so that
when the hospital’s risk management committee found that a
doctor had committed malpractice, they would invite the injured
patient to the hospital.30 When doing so, they would tell the
patient that he or she was welcome to bring an attorney.31 When
the patient arrived, the physician would explain what happened,
express regret, answer any questions and “make an offer of
restitution, which can involve subsequent corrective medical or
surgical treatment, [and] assistance with filing for [disability] or
monetary compensation.”32 The hospital would negotiate with
the patient and, in the event the patient had not retained a
lawyer and needed claims assistance, the hospital would help get
forms to file and once again advise the patient to seek
independent counsel.33
Researchers tracked the Lexington VAMC’s data to test the
impact of its apology policy.34 They determined that during a
seven-year period (1990–1996) of studying the Lexington VAMC’s
apology program, the facility’s payments were “moderate” and
“comparable to those of similar facilities.”35 Thus, when injured
patients were invited to bring legal counsel to discuss the doctor’s
error and potential financial resolutions, the study suggested

27 See Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, Does Sorry Work? The Impact of Apology Laws on
Medical Malpractice 3 (Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 04-2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1744225.
28 Kraman & Hamm, supra note 24, at 964.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 967.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 964.
35 Id. at 964, 966.
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that the injured patients’ claim received roughly the same
amount of money as in a traditional deny/defend situation.36
The program also provided other benefits, like diminishing
the injured patient’s anger and allowing for a continuing positive
relationship between doctor and patient.37 The study’s authors
also noted that their approach provided dramatic pecuniary
benefits by avoiding unnecessary litigation expenses.38 They
estimated that it costs the government $250,000 to litigate a
single malpractice case (for medical experts, travel, appeal,
incidental expenses). By contrast, their new apology procedures
required only an attorney, a paralegal to assist, and a few other
hospital employees.39
The Lexington VAMC research suggests that patients who
are malpractice victims and who are invited to bring an attorney
to negotiate on their behalf fare equally as well economically as
those that pursue more traditional litigation methods. The
added benefit is that the process happens more quickly, with
lower litigation costs and a legitimately ethical exchange that is
focused on the patient. The Lexington VAMC study’s authors
predicted that it would take much more proof of an economic
benefit before nongovernmental facilities would participate.40
The barrier they identified is the involvement of private
malpractice insurers, “each of which,” as the authors put it, “is
interested in paying as little money in settlement as possible.”41
The Lexington VAMC representatives’ prediction that their
policy would be met with skepticism proved true. For example,
after the Joint Commission’s disclosure requirement came into
effect, ECRI, a non-profit think-tank, expressed skepticism that
other facilities would voluntarily use an apology program: “There
are many who believe the experience of a VA hospital cannot be
replicated in the private sector because the VA, unlike the
private sector, has federal tort protections.”42
Reflecting the profit motivation of nongovernmental
insurers, the Lexington VAMC program is the last one for which
there has been published research that specifically recommended
that patients seek counsel before filing a claim. The newer
generation of apology programs includes some protections that

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

See id. at 965–66.
Id. at 966.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ECRI Inst., supra note 8, at 12.
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appear patient-friendly on their face, but remain adversarial at
their core.
B. Two Examples of Current Apology Programs
Since the finding that apology programs can be used as a moneysaving strategy, various insurance companies and hospitals have
instituted them. This section focuses on two examples that represent
common practices in the medical field today: COPIC and UMHS. While
they operate separately, common concerns are ultimately raised by each
model as they both include mechanisms that appear designed to pay
injured patients as little money as possible. Further, they both
encourage collaborative interpersonal behavior, but treat the financial
aspect of claims handling as adversarial.

i. COPIC
One of the models that apology advocates most commonly
cite is COPIC’s 3Rs program (“Recognize, Respond, Resolve”).43
COPIC is the primary insurer for Colorado physicians and, under
the 3Rs program, patients who suffer from an “unanticipated
outcome” can be offered up to $100 a day (capped at $5000) for
their absence from work and reimbursement for out-of-pocket
medical expenses of up to $25,000.44 COPIC defines their
program as a “no-fault” program, meaning that they consider
patients eligible regardless of whether there is clear
malpractice.45 Cases involving “never events,” which are acts of
clear malpractice (e.g., amputating the wrong leg), do not qualify
for the 3Rs program.46 Instead, the program leaves open the
43 Thomas H. Gallagher, David Studdert & Wendy Levinson, Disclosing Harmful
Medical Errors to Patients, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2713, 2716 (2007) (“The best-known
private-sector disclosure program is the ‘3Rs’ program at COPIC.”). See also Medical
Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong. 25 (2006) [hereinafter Medical
Liability] (statement of David Studdert, Associate Professor of Law and Public Health,
Harvard University Sch. of Public Health) (offering a health court proposal with the first
level of review “proceed[ing] along the lines developed by the insurer COPIC (the ‘3-R’s’
program)”).
44 Press Release, COPIC, Clarke Joins Colo. Health Found. Bd. (Jan. 7, 2011),
available at http://www.callcopic.com/who-we-are/press-room/press-room-detail?id=16;
3Rs Program, COPIC (last visited May 18, 2011), http://www.callcopic.com/home/whatwe-offer/coverages/medical-professional-liability-insurance-co/physicians-medicalpractices/special-programs/3rs-program/.
45 Even champions of apology programs question the viability of a no-fault program
like COPIC’s. For example, the UMHS program’s architect and leader, Attorney Richard
Boothman, testified before Congress that: “Alternatives loosely characterized as ‘no fault’
systems will not work. The medical and insurance communities will not be fairly served
by creating an entitlement not based on the reasonableness of care.” Medical Liability,
supra note 43 (statement of Richard C. Boothman, Chief Risk Officer, UMHS).
46 See Richard E. Quinn & Mary C. Eichler, The 3Rs Program: The Colorado
Experience, 51 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 709, 710 (2008) (recounting COPIC
history and the exclusion of NQF’s “never events”).
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ability for COPIC to quickly resolve murkier cases that may or
may not have been the result of malpractice.
The rules of program eligibility indicate that the program
seems intended to avoid reporting insured doctors’ malpractice to
regulatory authorities. For example, under the 3Rs program,
there can be no payments made for non-economic damages.47
Another rule specifically prevents a patient from involving an
attorney, and yet another rule disqualifies any patient who asks
for money in writing.48 Any of these events would require
reporting to the National Practitioners Data Bank.49 Thus, by
precluding anyone from participation who would otherwise seek
a lawyer or write a demand letter, COPIC can skirt reporting
malpractice.
The advocates for 3Rs might defend their program by
claiming that if patients participate in the COPIC program, they
may still theoretically pursue a malpractice claim because
COPIC does not require patients to sign a release.50 However,
the data indicates that not forcing a release is nearly irrelevant
because COPIC’s research has shown that even without a
release, fewer than twenty-four out of every twenty-five
participants do not pursue a claim after going through their
program.51 Even more troubling, the decision not to require a
release from patients appears motivated by selfish reasons, as
requiring a release would force COPIC to report the settlement to
state and federal regulators, which they are able to avoid by
calling it a “no-fault” program.52

47 Id. Payment for non-economic damages may also force COPIC to admit the
incident was a result of negligence, thus preventing the carrying-on of the fiction that
they make payments regardless of whether negligence was involved.
48 See A Success Story, 1 COPIC’S 3RS PROGRAM (COPIC Ins. Co., Denver, Colo.),
Mar. 2004 (listing exclusions from participation to include patients who have sent a
“[d]emand letter” and stating that “payments are not reported to the National
Practitioner Data Bank because they are not made in response to a written demand for
monetary compensation”). See also Carol Anne Tarrant, Dir., Facility Patient Safety and
Risk Mgmt., COPIC’s 3Rs Program: Recognize, Respond to and Resolve Patient Injury,
COPIC 18 (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.capsac.org/documents/Tarrant.CA.pdf (stating that
among the incentives for doctors to participate in 3Rs is no reporting to NPDB (National
Practitioners Data Bank) or CBME (Colorado Board of Medical Examiners)).
49 See Tarrant, supra note 48, at 18.
50 Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 710.
51 Case Studies: Focus on Disclosure, 3RS PROGRAM (COPIC Tr., Denver, Colo.), May
2011, at 1, available at www.callcopic.com/resources/custom/PDF/3rs-newsletter/3rs-may2011.pdf (“Our continuing experience is that only 3.4 percent of 3Rs cases with
reimbursements to patients subsequently result in malpractice claims or lawsuits. Also,
only 0.5 percent of such reimbursed 3Rs cases receive additional payments via
malpractice claims or lawsuits.”).
52 Bruce D. Gehle, A Quick Check on the Impact of Apology Laws on Claims and
Costs of Medical Malpractice, 11 HEALTHCARE LIABILITY & LITIG., May 2009, at 1, 2.
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The idea that 3Rs is only for “minor” cases is also
misleading. They purport to be a “limited program designed to
handle outcomes that are unlikely to involve serious negligence
or injury”; the facts suggest that this claim is misleading.53
While the 3Rs program does exclude death claims and “never
events,” the evidence suggests that COPIC still uses the 3Rs
program on cases involving very serious claims.54 In one account,
which COPIC fictionalized, but was of the magnitude “often dealt
with in COPIC’s 3Rs Program,” a 41-year-old patient underwent
a colonoscopy and suffered a perforation to his colon as a result.55
After the colonoscopy, the patient had severe abdominal pain due
to “free air” (indicating the doctor punctured the patient’s colon
during the colonoscopy).56 As a result, the surgical team then
had to perform additional surgery to repair the hole in the man’s
colon.57 This resulted in the patient being hospitalized for four
additional days and missing “approximately six weeks of work.”58
Despite their rhetoric, additional surgery, four days as an
inpatient, and six weeks of missed work cannot reasonably be
considered “not serious.”
Despite the ethical problems it poses, the 3Rs program has
been effective in dissuading patients from seeking the damages
they would be entitled to under more traditional litigation
channels. For example, in 2003, the payments to patients under
the 3Rs Program averaged $1820, as opposed to an average cost
of more than $250,000 for traditionally-handled claims handled
by the same insurer.59
Beyond under-compensating malpractice victims, the
broader impact of the 3Rs program has not been studied.
Specifically, the rules under which the program operates—from
not allowing attorney involvement to refusing to allow a patient
who has written a letter from participating—seem designed to
Id.
See, e.g., Success Story, 3 COPIC’S 3RS PROGRAM (COPIC Ins. Co., Denver, Colo.),
June 2006, available at http://www.callcopic.com/resources/custom/PDF/3rs-newsletter/
vol-3-issue-1-jun-2006.pdf (recounting a potentially grave injury addressed by the 3Rs
program).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Will Apologies to Patients Drive Malpractice Lawyers Out of Business?, MED
LEGAL NEWS (Med League Support Servs., N.J.), June 2006, at 2, available at
http://www.medleague.com/Articles/Newsletters/newsletter26.pdf.
This approach has
apparently been similarly effective in dissuading patients from seeking damages in other
years. For example, a 2005 article quotes a COPIC representative who states that “the
average payment in 3Rs cases is $5586, while the average outside the program is about
$284,000.” Deroy Murdock, “Sorry” Works, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 29, 2005, 8:03 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/215270/sorry-works/deroy-murdock.
53
54
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discourage responsible reporting.
In turn, this weakens
practitioner accountability and potentially harms patients who
subsequently are treated by doctors that have committed
malpractice but have not been investigated by the appropriate
agencies as a result.
ii. UMHS
The most commonly referenced apology program today is the
University of Michigan Healthcare Services’ model. UMHS
purports to provide quick compensation for viable claims, defend
claims they view as non-meritorious and “[r]educe patient
injuries . . . by learning from patients’ experiences.”60
The
architect of the UMHS program is Attorney Richard Boothman,
who spent two decades as a medical malpractice defense lawyer
before assuming his risk management post at UMHS.61 Attorney
Boothman has become one of the most prominent proponents of
apology programs in the United States.62
UMHS’s philosophy is consistent with the concept of “cooling
the mark out.”63 The underlying basis for the program is their
belief that people pursue malpractice claims because they seek
an explanation for their injury and have a desire to hold the
responsible person accountable.64 To respond to that, UMHS
created a system “more directly aimed at what drives a patient to
call a lawyer [which] would better address the root cause of the
problem.”65 Unlike COPIC, UMHS does allow patients to seek
legal advice, although the organization does not do so routinely.66
UMHS is a self-insured facility, which they state allows for
“consistency and alignment of ethical and financial motivation[s]
between the hospital, care provider, and insurer” which they
consider an “important advantage.”67 However, their program
does not have any built-in protection for patients against the
conflict of interest this creates. Instead, one must take it on faith
that UMHS’s risk management department is capable of acting
against the facility’s own financial interests and fully and fairly
compensating injured patients.
Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 139.
Biography, U. MICH. HEALTH SYS. (last visited Sept. 25, 2011),
http://surgery.med.umich.edu/portal/research/faculty/boothman.shtml.
62 Biography, supra note 61.
63 See infra Part III(A) (explaining the concept of “cooling the mark out” and how
UMHS’s model squares with it).
64 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 134.
65 Id.
66 E-mail from Richard C. Boothman, Chief Risk Officer, UMHS, to author (Aug. 10,
2011, 14:16 EDT) (on file with author) (“We have overtly advised patients to have
lawyers . . . but we do not routinely advise them to get a lawyer.”).
67 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 137.
60
61
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UMHS does not publish their strategy for approaching the
negotiations with the patients to whom they apologize. However,
a vignette UMHS uses to explain the mechanisms of their
program suggests that an adversarial mindset underlies the
program.68 In its literature, UMHS tells the story of JW, a
thirty-six year-old mother of two.69 In 2003, she presented to her
primary care physician’s office that she had found a lump in her
breast.70 No follow-up was ordered by the doctor.71 Two years
later, JW was diagnosed with breast cancer.72 It was treated
with a complete mastectomy and radiation therapy.73 Her
primary care doctor, one year later, “described her as disabled
due to chronic fatigue syndrome, depressed, suffering chronic
shoulder pain, and plagued by anxiety,” because of a perceived
increased likelihood of recurrence of cancer.74
The UMHS internal investigation committee found that the
care JW received was sub-par for many reasons.75 Three of its
reviewers said that the decisions her primary care doctor made
were below the standard of care.76 Some reviewers believed there
were ways to defend the case (including blaming JW for not
returning for care more aggressively), but admitted “they would
have handled it differently and [they] expected more of their
colleagues under the same or similar circumstances.”77
By its own estimate, UMHS believed that the case had a
value of somewhere between $3.1 and $3.7 million if JW won.78
Factoring in the chance of a plaintiff’s verdict at trial, which
UMHS believed was likely, they determined that the case should
settle for somewhere between $2,635,000 and $3,145,000.79
UMHS met with JW, along with her husband and their
attorney.80
UMHS brought one of its risk management
68 Medical Malpractice and Patient Safety at UMHS, U. MICH. HEALTH SYS. (last
visited Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.med.umich.edu/news/newsroom/mm.htm#summary
(“Our approach can be summarized as: ‘Apologize and learn when we’re wrong, explain
and vigorously defend when we’re right, and view court as a last resort.’”).
69 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 151.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 152, 157.
75 Id. at 152 (“All reviewers agreed the covering doctor’s care . . . was below
expectations for UMHS faculty. Three reviewers said that the decision not to follow up on
JW’s concerns with mammography and referral to a surgeon was a violation of the
standard of care.”).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 155.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 157. That JW was allowed to have an attorney participate is a positive
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consultants (most of whom are trained mediators).81 At the
outset of the meeting, UMHS apologized to JW.82 JW’s emotions
warmed because of UMHS’s collaborative demeanor.83 JW asked
if UMHS would settle the case for $2 million, a figure
considerably less than UMHS’s projected settlement value.84 In
response, UMHS accused JW of being “unreasonable” and
inflating the value of her claim.85 JW reduced her settlement
demand to $1.2 million, less than half of UMHS’s original
estimate, but UMHS again refused.86 Eventually, UMHS’s
tactics prevailed, with JW electing to accept UMHS’s $400,000
settlement offer.87
As a result, the apology program made it so that a case that
UMHS initially believed had a value of between $2.6 and $3.1
million, settled for only $400,000.88 This amount would cover the
cost of JW’s children’s college expenses, about which JW
expressed concern when she learned that her doctor’s malpractice
might result in her death.89 By UMHS’s initial estimate, the
$400,000 for which JW settled did not cover her future medical
costs, lost wages/benefits caused by their doctor’s negligence, nor
any non-economic damages for the emotional impact for JW’s
ordeal.90

advance beyond COPIC’s 3Rs program, which would disqualify the patient if she hired
counsel. See Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 710 (“If there was any attorney
involvement, 3Rs benefits and involvement would cease.”). The point of including this
vignette is to demonstrate that UMHS’s procedures remain fundamentally adversarial,
not to accuse UMHS of refusing to allow JW to seek representation. Although the legal
advice JW’s attorney provided seems sub-par (as discussed below, JW ultimately settled
the case for pennies on the dollar prior to discovery), that is hardly UMHS’s fault.
81 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 157.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 158 (“After that night (of the meeting), I left there like I was on a
mountaintop. I felt like I had finally been heard, they listened.”).
84 Id. at 156.
85 Id. (“The plaintiff’s lawyer’s economic assessment was critically reviewed by an
economist expert retained by UMHS and a contra-assessment was prepared, pointing out
unreasonable assumptions and inflated calculations.”).
86 Id. at 157.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 155, 157.
89 Id. at 156, 157.
90 Id. at 155. UMHS also claimed that JW, because of UMHS’s disclosure and
approach to resolution, did not suffer pain and suffering that she would have if they had
used the traditional “deny and defend” approach to her claim. Although emotional stress
resulting from the litigation process is not compensable in the civil justice system,
UMHS’s claim that avoiding the stress of litigation benefited JW is certainly a good thing,
although it would have no impact on the value of her case at trial. See, e.g., Ortega v.
Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 800 (1998) (holding that damages
may not be awarded for “litigation stress”).
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This outcome was a good result in the sense that JW was
pleased with it.91 However, the vignette leaves open several
questions that should be vitally important to consider:
In whose interest was UMHS acting when it paid JW
$400,000 in a settlement it viewed as being worth
more than seven times that amount?
If JW is unable to pay her future medical costs (which
UMHS estimated to be $250,000–$400,000) as a
result of accepting this settlement, who will do so?
How will JW and her family be compensated for the
$2,350,000–$2,750,000 in lost wages and benefits that
UMHS estimated she suffered as a result of its
doctor’s negligence if she becomes unable to work?
Because UMHS selectively releases data on their program, it
is unclear whether JW’s experience in the apology program was
representative. Even the statistics that UMHS publishes makes
it difficult to see what happens to individual claims with merit.
For example, a recent article written by Attorney Boothman and
others reported some aspects of the financial effects of UMHS’s
apology program.92 They reported that after UMHS implemented
the apology program, the overall number of claims dropped, as
did the amount of money spent both defending claims and
compensating patients.93 The study did not report, however,
statistics explaining whether individual patients that made
claims were compensated less after the program was
implemented. In other words, it has not been made public
whether patients with valid claims for malpractice are giving up
some compensation to which they are entitled in exchange for the
warm discussions UMHS provides. If the small glimpse provided
by JW’s case is a representative of what UMHS does, then the
organization derives significant financial benefits by paying less
money to patients injured by medical errors.94

91 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 158 (“I was perfectly satisfied after that night.
What that apology meant to me was that they had listened finally and I had been
heard.”). UMHS also seems to indicate that the act of taking part in the apology process
had a positive medical outcome on JW and drove her damages down. Id. at 156–58. The
basis for this is that JW’s position during negotiation was that her malpractice-related
injuries were disabling. Id. at 152. However, after the negotiations were completed, she
returned to work. Id. at 158. The idea that this negotiation single-handedly transformed
JW from being totally and permanently disabled to someone who could immediately
resume her prior life is simply unsupported by any evidence other than UMHS’s say-so.
92 Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation
of a Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 213 (2010).
93 Id. at 215, 217–19.
94 See Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 151–58.
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When Attorney Boothman testified before the United States
Senate in 2006, he cited the dramatic successes of the UMHS
program in lowering costs and reducing the time of claimcompletion.95 He noted that physicians need to ask, “Why would
my patient feel the need for an advocate?”96 Although this
question was undoubtedly meant to be rhetorical, it requires an
actual answer: Patients need an advocate because programs like
UMHS have attorneys whose primary obligation is to protect the
assets of their organization. This dynamic results in what is, in
actuality, an adversarial environment that simply uses
collaborative language. Without legal advice of their own,
patients who take part in apology programs must trust that risk
managers would violate their obligation to their own employer (of
keeping overall costs low), in order to give them an appropriate
settlement. There is simply no evidence that this has, or will,
occur and no program has released any data to that effect.
Yet, it should not be lost that the UMHS model does most of
the things a good disclosure program should do (including many
things COPIC would refuse to allow): it advises the patient of
what happened, allows the patient to seek legal counsel
(although it does not necessarily advise it), increases the speed of
settlement negotiations to keep costs low, and so on. 97
Ultimately, though, stories like that of JW also expose its
underlying adversarial nature.
III. CONVINCING PATIENTS THAT LESS MONEY IS BETTER
Because program administrators will not admit to it, it
cannot be said with absolute certainty that medical apology
programs are specifically designed to exploit the research on
influencing patients to accept less compensation for valid injuries
caused by malpractice. However, what can be said with accuracy
is that what apology programs are willing to publish about their
approach makes their behavior at least appear to be consistent
with the research on how to influence people to control an
outcome in a negotiation.
A. Cooling the Mark Out
In 1952, Erving Goffman explained that when con men “cool
the mark out,” as a method of preventing their dissatisfied victim
from complaining to the authorities, they use a variety of

95
96
97

Medical Justice, supra note 43, at 4.
Id. at 7.
See generally Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 137–50.
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methods.98 In its most basic form, cooling the mark out requires
that “one of the operators stays with the mark and makes an
effort to keep the anger of the mark within manageable and
sensible proportions . . . and exercises upon the mark the art of
consolation.”99 In other words, the primary function of the
“cooler”—the person tasked with consoling the mark—is “to
define the situation for the mark in a way that makes it easy for
him to accept the inevitable” and quietly move on without
causing unwanted negative attention for the con men.100
Goffman envisioned cooling the mark out as being applied in
all sorts of social relationships.101 Even legitimate organizations,
according to Goffman, have a need to cool out customers.102 In
the medical industry, Goffman noted that doctors frequently
serve as coolers to break bad news to patients as a way to control
their response.103 The doctor is often the one to do this because it
is advisable to “give the task to someone whose status relative to
the mark will serve to ease the situation in some way.”104 The
doctor-patient relationship involves just this sort of disparate
social status. As a result, it should come as no surprise that
apology programs frequently use a doctor to have a discussion
with the patient.105
Goffman said that the effectiveness of cooling the mark out
rests in creating a system that allows the mark, “under suitable
guidance, to give full vent to his initial shock.”106 In other words,
See Goffman, supra note 5, at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 456. Others have applied the concept of cooling the mark out to different
contexts. For example, some see the role of junior/community college administrators to be
coolers for students who are not “college material.” Burton R. Clark, The “Cooling-Out”
Function in Higher Education, 65 AM. J. SOC. 569, 569 (1960). Others have studied the
process of women who cool out undesirable male suitors at singles bars. See, e.g., David A.
Snow et al., “Cooling Out” Men in Singles Bars and Nightclubs: Observations on the
Interpersonal Survival Strategies of Women in Public Places, 19 J. CONTEMP.
ETHNOGRAPHY 423, 423 (1991). The process of cooling out has been studied in legal
contexts, including the role of criminal defense attorneys who must prepare their clients
to accept a jail sentence. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game:
Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC’Y REV. 15, 27 (1967). Cooling out
has even subtlety been employed in popular entertainment. In the hit 1989 film, Road
House, Dalton (played by Patrick Swayze) is a professional “cooler” who uses his expertise
in psychology and New York University philosophy degree to combat a group of violent
nightclub patrons who are disrupting a small town bar, the “Double Deuce,” and the
surrounding community. ROAD HOUSE (United Artists 1989).
102 Goffman, supra note 5, at 455.
103 Id. at 457.
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 142 (describing physician-delivered
disclosure and apology at UMHS); Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 713 (describing the
value of direct physician/patient disclosure and apology at COPIC).
106 Goffman, supra note 5, at 458.
98
99
100
101
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the mark is encouraged to articulate their righteous anger and
move beyond the situation at hand. This part of the process is
specifically spelled out in various apology protocols.
For
example, in the SorryWorks!107 model, diffusion of answer is
defined as the first thing that a doctor should understand about
effective apologies: “The key is anger . . . .disclosure [sic] and
apology keep a lid on anger, whereas traditional deny and defend
risk management strategies increase anger felt by patients &
families, and increase the likelihood of costly litigation.”108 When
they provide this advice, SorryWorks! recognizes that its function
is not to increase a patient’s knowledge or the doctor-patient
relationship. Instead, their reason is financial: “An enormous &
growing body of data is showing that disclosure coupled with
apology (when appropriate) actually reduces lawsuits, litigation
expenses, and settlements/judgments.”109
In other words,
allowing the patient to vent is a money-saver for hospitals and
insurers at patients’ expense.
One specific technique Goffman notes is that the cooler can
effectuate the process by assigning a new role to the mark.110
Medical apology programs do this as well, at times asking
patients who have been cooled out to tell their story and
encourage others to do the same. For example, JW, the cancer
survivor about whom UMHS wrote, was enlisted to film a video
extolling UMHS’s apology program and her satisfaction with it.111
Coolers themselves sometimes need to be convinced to follow
their role because of internal conflict about what they are doing
to the mark. To be able to participate in cooling out, Goffman
found that the cooler “protects himself from feelings of guilt by
arguing that the customer is not really in need of the service he
expected to receive . . . and complaints are a sign of bile, not a
sign of injury.”112
The apology literature is replete with
rationalizations that the pursuit of damages for malpractice is
often based upon an injured patient’s anger.113 Likewise, the
107 SorryWorks! is an “advocacy organization for disclosure, apology (when
appropriate), and upfront compensation (when necessary) after adverse medical events.”
About Us, SORRYWORKS! (last visited Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.sorryworks.net/
about.phtml.
108 5 Things Every Doctor Should Know About Disclosure!, SORRYWORKS! (last visited
Aug. 10, 2011), http://sorryworks.net/fivethings.phtml [hereinafter 5 Things].
109 5 Things, supra note 108.
110 Goffman, supra note 5, at 456–57.
111 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 157.
112 Goffman, supra note 5, at 455.
113 See, e.g., Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 133 (explaining patients file suit when
they feel lied to or mislead); Kraman & Hamm, supra note 24, at 963 (illustrating reasons
patients file suit, including breakdowns in the doctor/patient relationship due to
physicians’ failure to disclose errors).
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literature on apologies is filled with rhetoric about patients and
lawyers injured by malpractice seeking “big bucks,” presumably
for injuries that do not justify it.114 This language used by
apology programs supports Goffman’s theory that those involved
from the medical perspective seek justifications that allow them
to inoculate themselves from the guilt associated with the
process.
B. The Psychology of Apology
Not only does Goffman’s explanation of cooling the mark out
appear consistent with the strategy of medical apology programs,
psychologists have also explained how apologies affect
individuals’ interpretations of an incident that gave rise to their
legal claim, as well as their decision to seek legal advice for it.115
In summary, the findings show that not only is a person less
likely to pursue litigation following a doctor’s apology, but even if
a patient does still pursue money damages, the patient is likely
to adopt a more pliant negotiating position.116 This generalized
research squares with the research performed by apology
programs themselves. For example, UMHS’s research found that
of the patients that participate, “71% admitted that they
accepted less in settlement than they would have had they
litigated the case.”117
A leading scholar on the role of apology in the law, Professor
Jennifer Robbennolt of the University of Illinois, has written a
series of works exploring the role of apologies in litigation.118

114 See, e.g., Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 709–10 (“Only one third of dollars
actually reach injured parties. At the same time, it seemed truly substandard care was
not reliably identified by the legal system. Furthermore, this system was inherently
adversarial almost always destroying the physician/patient relationship.”).
115 See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Civil Justice, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL
JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 195, 197 (Brian H. Bornstein et al.
eds., 2008) [hereinafter Robbenolt, Civil Justice]. “A growing body of studies suggests
that apologies do influence claimant decision making in a number of ways, including
decisions to consult attorneys for advice, decisions about whether or not to file suit,
judgments about negotiating positions, and ultimate decisions about settlement.” Id. at
209.
116 See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL L.
STUD. 333, 333 (2006) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Settlement Levers].
117 J. Sybil Biermann & Richard Boothman, There Is Another Approach to Medical
Malpractice Disputes, 4 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 148, 148 (2006).
118 See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical
Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 460 (2003) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Legal
Settlement] (examining empirical evidence of the effect of apology on perception and
decision-making); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Medical Error, 467 CLINICAL
ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 376, 376 (2009) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Apologies and
Med. Error]; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t Know About the Role of
Apologies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (2005)
[hereinafter Robbennolt, What We Know].
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While apology programs do not publish the psychological
mechanisms they employ when dealing with patients, Professor
Robbennolt’s findings about what effectively persuades a person
square very well with what the literature indicates happens in
apology programs.119
First, apologies appear to work when they lessen the degree
of anger patients feel toward their physicians.120 In fact, the
“types of injurious actions that are often at issue in civil
litigation—violation of the victim’s autonomy—have been
specifically linked to anger responses.”121 The way a physician
apologizes influences the patient’s attitude toward the physician
and the prospects of settlement.122 In fact, an inadequate or
poorly delivered apology may cause a person to file suit.123 This
is known by those that create apology protocols, with some
programs reminding doctors that although the Joint Disclosure
rules do not require an apology, failing to do so will likely make
the situation worse because the communication will lack “human
touch.”124 Apology advocates also know the medical institution’s
relationship with the patient is strained after they harm
patients, and counsel physicians to “bring the patient and family
closer and embrace them” by making the patient “their best
friend.”125 This appears to match the finding that there is a
correlation between anger and litigation, and plays out in
apology programs when programs recommend specific strategies
for diffusing that anger:
Any effective, meaningful apology has four basic elements: (1)
Empathy or “sorry”; (2) Admission of fault . . . [;] (3) Explanation of
what happened and how it will be prevented from happening again;
(4) As necessary, an offer of compensation or some sort of fix to the
problem that has been created. These elements, in the right cases,
eliminate anger felt by the aggrieved party . . . . It is important to
explain what happened and how it will be prevented from happening
again. . . . Patients want to know what happened.126

See, e.g., Robbennolt, Legal Settlement, supra note 118, at 487.
Robbennolt, Civil Justice, supra note 115, at 202; Robbennolt, Legal Settlement,
supra note 118, at 488. This, of course, is also consistent with the observation Goffman
made about the role of a cooler in allowing a mark to vent. Goffman, supra note 4, at 457
(“Another standard method of cooling the mark out—one which is frequently employed in
conjunction with other methods—is to allow the mark to explode, to break down, to cause
a scene, to give full vent to his reactions and feelings, to ‘blow his top.’ If this release of
emotions does not find a target, then it at least serves a cathartic function.”).
121 Robbennolt, Civil Justice, supra note 115, at 202.
122 Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 116, at 363.
123 Robbennolt, What We Know, supra note 118, at 1024.
124 CRICO’s Perspective, supra note 2.
125 DOUG WOJCIESZAK ET AL., SORRY WORKS! DISCLOSURE, APOLOGY, AND
RELATIONSHIPS PREVENT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 60–61 (2d ed. 2010).
126 Id. at 62–63.
119
120
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In terms of timing, patients are more impacted by apologies
delivered soon after the negligence occurred, as opposed to later
apologies, which are more easily recognizable as ploys to avoid
litigation.127 To avoid this, apology advocates tell physicians to
initiate an apology as soon as possible.128
In terms of content of the apology, psychologists have found
that patients are most influenced when physicians offer “full”
apologies under which they take total responsibility for causing
the harm.129 A “partial” apology—when the physician simply
expresses sympathy—has less of an effect on a patient’s attitude,
but still influences patients to settle for less than if the physician
offered no apology at all.130 Apology advocates have recognized
that even these partial measures have benefits: when physicians
are unwilling to take responsibility for adverse outcomes (or
when, for example, that expression of responsibility might not be
covered under the jurisdiction’s apology shield law), apology
advocates still encourage them to make this partial apology:
“Convey compassion and empathy for [the] patient’s and family’s
suffering . . . [Words like] ‘I’m sorry that you. . .’ [or] ‘I am sorry
for your,’” etc., can assist in re-building trust between the doctor
and patient.
Psychologists have also determined several factors that
affect
patients’
subconscious
attitudes
towards
their
physicians.131 For example, the way a physician dresses has a
demonstrable effect upon patients’ perceptions, establishing
authority and credibility. Anecdotal evidence suggests that those
in the medical field are well aware of this. One commentator
reported that a doctor told her:
[L]uckily for us, most patients will accept an apology, but it matters a
lot how you give it. If you apologize in the hospital or in your office,
you’ve got it made. It’s really important to have the white coat on and
a stethoscope around your neck, though. If you go in there dressed as
any Joe, it won’t work.132

Apology experts encourage physicians to carefully control the
conditions of the disclosure session. Each possible variable,
including the apologizer’s manner of dress133 and the location of
127 MICHAEL S. WOODS, HEALING WORDS: THE POWER OF APOLOGY IN MEDICINE 45
(2004) (“Delays in communication make patients and families suspicious.”).
128 Id.
129 Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 116, at 368.
130 Id.
131 John E. Ware & Mary K. Snyder, Dimensions of Patient Attitudes Regarding
Doctors and Medical Care Services, 13 MED. CARE 669, 670 (1975).
132 Erin Ann O’Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent
Doctors Might Have in Common, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1079–80 (2004).
133 Shakaib U. Rehman et al., What to Wear Today? Effect of Doctor’s Attire on the
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the session134 have been studied by the medical industry and
have the ability to influence the patient’s reaction to the benefit
of the hospital or insurer.
On its own, there is nothing wrong with physicians using
psychology to maintain their relationships with patients after
adverse effects—in some respects, these strategies are simply
good customer service. The problem, however, is when these
strategies are used to influence legal decisions as opposed to
medical ones.135
IV. IF EVERYONE IS HAPPY, WHAT’S WRONG?136
The literature on apology programs is replete with anecdotes
conveying the happiness of patients who gladly agreed to resolve
a case as a result of an apology, even if they did so for little or no
compensation.137 The underlying argument seems to be that if a
patient is happy, then it is a good result. The literature,
however, never makes clear what percentage of patients are
ignorant about what they are giving up when they take a partial
payment instead of full compensation. The programs leave open
the possibility of short-changing patients on economic damages,
and (especially) non-economic damages, which apology programs
seem fixated on washing away altogether. The literature also
never considers the long-term effect of this partial compensation
on the patient and society as a whole. This part addresses that
issue.
The tort system addresses the challenge of compensating
victims for their damages—making them whole—by calculating
values for each type of harm suffered.138 The value of many types
of harm is simple to determine because there are market rates

Trust and Confidence of Patients, 118 AM. J. MED. 1279, 1280 (2005). Research indicates
patients overwhelmingly want physicians to display that authority, and meeting that
expectation builds trust. Id. at 1283.
134 See TRUOG ET AL., supra note 10, at 81 (encouraging physicians to disclose errors
at the bedside or a quiet location where everyone can be comfortably seated).
135 See, e.g., Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 116, at 363 (discussing the
effect of apologies on the settlement of potential medical malpractice legal claims).
136 I give particular thanks and recognition to my research assistant extraordinaire,
Christopher J. Fiorentino, who took the lead in drafting this part of the Article.
137 See MASS. COAL. FOR THE PREVENTION OF MED. ERRORS, WHEN THINGS GO
WRONG: RESPONDING TO ADVERSE EVENTS
28–29
(2006),
available
at
http://www.macoalition.org/documents/respondingToAdverseEvents.pdf
(recounting
patient’s “positive” experience after she received an apology and “token” compensation
after negligence in her cancer treatments); Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 715
(reporting patient “expressed sincere appreciation” after COPIC reimbursed her $3898 for
a damaged ureter that required an extra surgery and extended recovery).
138 1 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.01 (2011).
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for the jury to reference.139 However, non-economic harms are
more difficult because:
There is no direct correspondence between money and harm to the
body, feelings or reputation. There is no market price for a scar or for
loss of hearing since the damages are not measured by the amount for
which one would be willing to suffer the harm. The discretion of the
judge or jury determines the amount of recovery, the only standard
being such an amount as a reasonable person would estimate as fair
compensation.140

That pain and suffering can be difficult to calculate,
however, is not an appropriate reason to downplay its
significance. As Professor Neil Komesar of the University of
Wisconsin Law School has noted:
The importance of these nonpecuniary losses can be seen by asking
yourself whether you would be indifferent or even nearly indifferent
between an uninjured state and a severely injured state, such as
paraplegia, blindness, or severe brain damage, so long as your income
and wealth remained constant.141

For this reason, the courts have long recognized the
importance of compensating plaintiffs for their suffering.142
By contrast, apology programs only offer a small portion of
the total range of damages. COPIC only compensates victims for
a maximum of $30,000 of out-of-pocket expenses, and does not
compensate victims for their pain and suffering.143
It is
unclear—because they have not released the data—as to how
UMHS tabulates damages.
However, in JW’s case, the
settlement value was tied to the projected cost of her children’s
college education, as opposed to the value of the damages she
sustained.144
Nothing was paid to her for non-economic
damages.145
Tort reformers have argued that non-economic damage
awards are unfair because juries tend to unreasonably calculate
them in favor of a plaintiff.146 Seizing upon this notion, the
Id. at § 1.02.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (1979).
Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 58 (1990).
142 See, e.g., Random v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 15 N.Y. 415, 424 (1857) (awarding a
negligently injured railroad passenger damages for “bodily pain and suffering, without
reference to the time when endured”).
143 Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 710.
144 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 156.
145 Id.
146 See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the
Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 164–65 (2004) (arguing that pain and suffering
damages are inconsistent with the goals of tort law—to “return the injured person to his
pre-injury position”—because the only damages that “can genuinely nullify some of the
139
140
141
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insurance industry has waged a lengthy campaign to limit
malpractice damages (and thus to limit their own exposure).147
Their lobbyists have convinced over half of state legislatures to
implement tort reforms and place arbitrary caps on how much
plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits can recover, regardless of
how badly the victim is injured.148 As a result, legislatures have
somewhat skewed tort litigation in favor of the injurers rather
than the injured.
Nevertheless,
unlike
apology
programs
involving
unrepresented injured patients, the traditional litigation system
is administered by impartial judges, essentially requiring that
each party be represented by legal counsel, and utilizing
disinterested juries to calculate damages. By contrast, in apology
programs, part of the goal seems to be keeping plaintiffs away
from the tort system altogether. The result is that, when
patients—particularly
unrepresented
patients—are
compensated, there is no third party considering the itemized
damages. Instead, the calculation seems to be based on the
smallest figure that will mollify the patient.
By playing on psychology and the dynamic of an injured
patients’ interaction with a physician coached by an insurance
company, those that would otherwise be required to pay the
pain are economic damages for medical expenses to cover pain management and
rehabilitation, not noneconomic damages for pain and suffering”). “The tacit assumption
[made by opponents of noneconomic damages] is that pain and suffering damages are
frivolous and too often granted for phantom or imaginary pain.” Michael L. Rustad,
Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Meritorious
Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331, 379–80 (2006).
147 See Michael Rustad, The Jurisprudence of Hope: Preserving Humanism in Tort
Law, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1099, 1128 (1994) (noting that in 1994 insurance companies
had lobbied for fifteen years to limit medical malpractice liability).
148 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice
Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 396 (2005) (noting that a majority of states have
imposed some kind of limitation on the amount of damages available to a plaintiff in a
medical malpractice claim). For example, in Massachusetts, damages for noneconomic
losses are limited to $500,000 unless there are “special circumstances” that justify raising
the award above the cap. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West 2000). In
California, noneconomic losses are capped at $250,000 regardless of extenuating
circumstances. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997). In Colorado, home of COPIC
insurance, all damages in medical malpractice cases are limited to $1,000,000 (of which
only $250,000 may be for noneconomic damages) unless the court grants special leave.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302(1)(b) (West 2005). The theoretical purpose of capping
damages is to lower physicians’ insurance premiums, but the data does not support that
conclusion. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice Liability on
the Delivery of Health Care, 8 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1, 13 (2005), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/achandr/FHPR_EffectofMalpracticeHealthCareDelivery_2
005.pdf. Further, early advocates of caps contended they had no negative effect on
patient care, but these caps may actually make medical care more dangerous. See Janet
Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes 36
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12478, 2006) (finding damage caps
increase complications of childbirth).
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traditional damages have discovered value in disclosure and
apology.
While protecting profits is an understandable goal for an
insurance company, it comes at a cost: every extra dollar of profit
realized by the insurer resulting from a medical apology is a
dollar taken from an injured patient. On its own, convincing an
individual not to sue is no different than any other “bad”
settlement. What makes this different is the appearance of a
system of methods designed to dissuade patients from actually
considering their rights before settling for short money. It also
creates a secondary problem; that plaintiffs who accept
settlements for less money than their claim is worth may become
a drain on society. With no damages to cover future lost wages or
future medical expenses, the taxpayers may be left footing the
bill for the negligence of others.
By ignoring the measures of damages applied by American
courts and steering patients from a neutral venue to redress
innocent victims’ injuries, these programs stack the deck in favor
of the insurance companies who administer them. The result is
that others bear the long-term costs of going uncompensated for
their physicians’ mistakes.
V. THE CURE: “MALPRACTICE MIRANDA” AND OTHER FIXES
Apology programs, if run properly, are worth saving. This is
because, despite all of the potential for abuse, they still have
positive attributes: insurers and injured patients alike benefit
from lower litigation costs (both with respect to attorneys’ fees on
both sides, as well as reducing the costs of discovery, experts, and
other expenses); they promote faster resolutions; they allow for
an ongoing doctor-patient relationship (assuming the patient is
comfortable with it); and, most importantly, they aid the
patient’s subjective sense of satisfaction with the resolution and
outlook for future treatment. There is no reason that these goals
could not still be met while reforming what requires repair. This
part of the Article suggests necessary changes to do so.
A. Assuring Injured Patients Understand Their Rights
The primary problem with current apology programs is that
injured patients are put in a position in which they might easily
confuse the willingness of a provider to communicate with the
willingness of a provider to compensate them fully. Therefore,
the first and most important step is to require apology programs
to allow their patients a real opportunity to educate themselves
on their rights before being influenced to settle.
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To prevent a patient’s potential confusion, apology programs
should be required to advise patients in any case that has more
than a nominal value that they will not resolve the matter with
the patient unless and until the patient is educated on his or her
legal rights.149 This should involve advising patients to speak to
an attorney. Patients who, after being so advised, choose not to
seek counsel should be given a reasonable period of time
thereafter to make a sober decision. This “Malpractice Miranda”
would help patients understand their rights and give them an
opportunity to make a sober, intelligent decision about their
needs as a result of the malpractice.
Providing information about the possible need to seek an
attorney is a rarity among apology programs, with ninety-six
percent not doing so.150 Involving attorneys is recommended by
the SorryWorks! organization: “Patients and families should
never feel like the hospital/insurer is trying to pull a fast one on
them, and by encouraging involvement of [personal injury]
attorneys you remove those fears and make your disclosure
program credible.”151 Yet, neither COPIC (which expressly
forbids it) nor UMHS (which allows attorney involvement, but
does not expressly recommend it) accept the view that patients
are entitled to know their legal rights before negotiation. One
possible reason for this discrepancy is that SorryWorks! is an
advocacy group that has no financial stake in the resolution of
claims. By contrast, self-insured hospitals like UMHS and
insurers like COPIC are obligated to pay the cost of a settlement
and may believe that educating patients about legal decisions
could result in more expenses for their organizations.
Because apology programs influence legal decisions, the
ethical rules that require a doctor to recommend to malpractice
victims that they seek legal counsel should be parallel to that of a
similarly situated attorney who suspects he or she has committed
malpractice. When a lawyer abuses a client’s trust in order to
avoid a malpractice suit, the lawyer is violating his or her

149 Not every error that merits an apology, of course, should go down the legal path.
Minor errors that could never realistically result in a claim being brought should be
handled informally (e.g., an overly-rough phlebotomist causing bruising). However, once
risk management becomes involved, it would follow that because the hospital is
evaluating the matter from a legal angle, the injured patient should be afforded the same
opportunity.
150 See Lamb et al., supra note 16, at 77 (stating that only four percent of hospitals
with disclosure programs provide information about lawyers).
151 September 13, 2006 Newsletter, SORRYWORKS! (last visited Sept. 10, 2011,
11:23 PM), http://sorryworks.net/newsletter20060913.phtml.
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responsibility to the client.152 The American Bar Association’s
ethical rules state:
A lawyer shall not . . . settle a claim or potential claim for . . . liability
with an unrepresented client or former client unless that person is
advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel
in connection therewith.153

The legal community has accepted that this is of vital
importance. As a result, lawyers failing to disclose this conflict of
interest before settling a claim are subject to steep penalties, and
may lose their licenses.154
The reason given to lawyers for this ethical obligation is as
applicable to the doctors that ask their injured patients to make
a legally significant decision about settlement: “By seeking to
settle his own liability, a lawyer places himself in direct conflict
with a client. Requiring lawyers to advise clients to consult
independent counsel before settling a malpractice dispute helps
ensure that clients are well informed before they give up
important rights.”155
Many of the programs outlining disclosure measures suggest
language for doctors to use to show empathy, respect, and
understanding of the gravity of the situation. Under the concept
of the “Malpractice Miranda,” this language could be
supplemented with language about the legal aspects of the
malpractice apology program. The doctor could say:
My goal is to make you better. In addition to promising to do my best
to fix your injuries, I want you to understand that because of this
error, you have legal rights. I tell you this because I do not just accept
responsibility for what happened to you medically, but because I also
accept the consequences of that. Therefore, you have to know that I
do not take it personally if you pursue your legal rights. In fact, I buy
insurance for just this reason and, although I am sad that it is needed,
my goal is to make you whole again, including getting fair
compensation. I am not a lawyer, and just like you would not want a
lawyer to give medical advice, a physician should not give legal
advice—especially when there is potentially a conflict of interest.
152 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (2011) (discussing conflicts of interest
in client-lawyer relationships).
153 Id.
154 See, e.g., In re Carson, 991 P.2d 896, 903, 905 (Kan. 1999) (censuring publicly a
lawyer who attempted to settle an unrepresented former client’s malpractice case);; In re
Henderson, 819 So. 2d 296, 301–02 (La. 2002) (disbarring a lawyer for failing to disclose
malpractice and seeking a release from his client without advising him to seek third-party
legal advice); In re Tallon, 447 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (App. Div. 1982) (suspending a lawyer from
practice for six months for failure to disclose advisability of independent counsel while
negotiating a malpractice release).
155 ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT § 51:1112 (2011).

Do Not Delete

2011]

11/18/2011 4:38 PM

Medical Apology Programs

335

Therefore, before we agree to any amount of compensation, or any
other way we agree is fair to make you whole, I want you to speak to a
lawyer. It is up to you if you choose to do so, but my advice is that you
should do so. I will not allow you to sign any release156 before you
have spoken to a lawyer or you have had some time to think about it.
This is because I feel badly about this situation and I want the best for
you, even if it means that my insurance company has to pay you
money for this accident.

The industry’s advocates would likely argue that patients
who participate in apology programs are satisfied with having
done so, thus they are, by definition, successful.157 That misses
the point: blissful ignorance is not something for which the
medical community, or society as a whole, should strive. To date,
the medical-insurance industry’s research does not make clear if
apology program participants are ever even aware of what it is
that they are giving up when they settle their cases as part of an
apology program. If apology programs were willing to provide
this education, it would set the stage for a fair result. By
contrast, if insurance companies feel obligated to try to pay the
minimum possible amount of money to patients who have been
the victims of malpractice, they should, at the least, not make the
doctors who pay premiums complicit in doing so. Doctors can,
and should, be free to tell patients that legal advice is the best
route to help them get the compensation they need to care for
themselves and their loved ones as a result of an unfortunate
medical event.
B. Processing Claims Quickly and Fairly
UMHS and the Lexington VAMC both identify the ability to
resolve claims quickly as a benefit to apology programs.158 It
would follow that prompt resolution would also potentially
benefit patients, as long as they have an opportunity to fully
consider their options before choosing whether to pursue
litigation.
To accomplish fast claims-processing, as well as fairness to
allow patients to consider their options, one solution is to allow

156 Of course, some disclosure programs, like COPIC’s 3Rs program, do not require a
release. In that case, the doctor should tell the patient that they should consider
pursuing a claim and that the disclosure program will not offer them any money until
they do so.
157 See Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 158 (publicizing the happiness JW stated
she felt after participating in their apology program).
158 See Kachalia et al., supra note 92, at 220 (attributing a substantial proportion of
reduced litigation costs at UMHS to reduced claims processing times); Kraman & Hamm,
supra note 24, at 966 (explaining how local settlement allows the VA to avoid the “hidden
expenses of litigation”).

Do Not Delete

336

11/18/2011 4:38 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:2

for immediate settlement following an apology, as long as the
patient certifies they have spoken with an attorney about their
legal rights. If the patient chooses not to seek counsel, they
should be required to have a cooling off period of six months
before settling any claim. Use of this type of time period has
been approved by the UMHS when the six months is a hiatus
that prevents a patient from suing.159 Using the same reasoning
as UMHS, it follows that one who wishes to accept a settlement
as part of a disclosure program should likewise be given six
months to think through their decision before making a
permanent decision with potentially lifelong consequences on the
patient and family.
Another step to make claims processing faster, cheaper and
more efficient would be for hospitals and insurers whose insured
have committed a negligent error to provide injured patients
with a simple, one page “Stipulation of Liability.”
This
stipulation could be provided as soon as the initial meeting postincident between doctor and patient (and patient’s attorney, if
desired by the patient). The effect of the stipulation would be
that the medical provider would be admitting to being at fault
and having caused the patient’s damages. The stipulation would
be accompanied by a request for either a jury trial on the limited
issue of the patient’s damages, or an assessment of damages
hearing in which a judge determines the patient’s damages.
The stipulation would benefit the medical provider’s insurer
because it would save the expense of pre-trial litigation (attorney
fees, expert opinions on the issue of liability, deposition
transcript costs, etc.), and would allow for a more efficient
processing of the case, with the only issue requiring
determination being the amount of the patient’s damages. It
would also be ethically sound: it would be a recognition of
responsibility and a willingness to participate in our society’s
mechanism for deciding how to determine the cost to accompany
that responsibility.
159 Among the reasons stated by the UMHS hospital’s website for the success of their
disclosure program are:
We’re fortunate to be located in Michigan, a state that passed sensible medical
malpractice reform in the 1990s and is not having some of the same crisis
situations as other states. Our state law, among other things, builds a sixmonth “cooling off” period into the malpractice lawsuit process. If a patient is
thinking about bringing suit against a doctor or hospital for medical
malpractice, the patient must first alert prospective defendants of their
complaints with a “notice of intent,” and both parties then have six months to
consider their cases before going to court.
Medical Malpractice and Patient Safety at UMHS, U. MICH. HEALTH SYS. (last visited
July 25, 2011), http://www.med.umich.edu/news/newsroom/mm.htm [hereinafter U. OF
MICH. HEALTH SYS.].
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C. Closing COPIC-Style Loopholes
Any time a patient resolves a case as part of an
apology/disclosure process, even if it’s framed as a “no-fault”
program like COPIC’s 3Rs program, the provider should still be
required to report the act of malpractice.
The databases
associated with malpractice claims serve a critical public safety
purpose to inform patients (and licensing authorities) of whether
providers are negligent in their care. That a doctor could escape
this because he or she was able to convince a patient not to
litigate an otherwise viable malpractice claim not only is a
disservice to the public in general, but serves as motivation for
the negligent medical provider to inappropriately press the
harmed patient into settling.
D. Repealing Apology Shield Laws
Finally, medical apology shield laws should be repealed.
Although the anecdotal evidence indicates that for an attorney to
actually attempt to use an admission of fault against a physician
at trial would be detrimental to a case against that doctor,160 that
does not change the fact that doctors should play by the same set
of rules as all other people.161 This change would mean that a
doctor’s apology or admission against interest, as a norm, is
admissible. This is simply the same default standard as exists
for an attorney who admits malpractice to a client or a driver
that admits negligent driving to the person he hit.
CONCLUSION
In concluding this Article, it is important to point out three
things that it did not argue. First, it did not argue that patients
must, or even should, pursue a malpractice claim against a
doctor that has treated them carelessly and caused them injury.
Adults can, and should, be expected to make responsible
decisions about the benefits and disadvantages of pursuing a
160 TRUOG ET AL., supra note 10, at 46 (citations omitted) (“As the president of the
South Carolina Trial Association stated in testimony before the South Carolina Senate, ‘I
would never introduce a doctor’s apology in court. It is my job to make a doctor look bad
in front of a jury, and telling the jury the doctor apologized and tried to do the right thing
kills my case.’”).
161 See generally Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, “I’ve Said I’m Sorry,
Haven’t I?” A Study of the Identity Implications and Constraints that Apologies Create for
their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10, 15 (2004) (demonstrating victims who reject
apologies are viewed less sympathetically by third parties). Advocates justify tort
reforms, such as apology laws, by claiming those laws will reduce the cost of medical
malpractice insurance, but the laws have not had that effect; instead, they appear more
closely linked to helping insurance companies cover losses sustained in stock market
speculation. See June Smith Tyler, Medical Malpractice Statutes: Special Protection for a
Privileged Few?, 12 N. KY. L. REV 295, 299–303 (1985).
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legal course of action, just as they should make educated,
informed medical decisions. The problem, this Article argues, is
that the current model for apology programs is designed to make
it harder for patients to reach these reasonable, informed
decisions. This need not be the situation; there are simple, fair
fixes to the problem created by apology programs to prevent
parties responsible to pay for the damages caused by malpractice
to victimize patients by convincing them not to pursue claims
that their insurers would have to pay. To correct this problem,
this Article argued that malpractice victims require simple
protections that even the playing field.
Second, this Article did not accept the insurance industry’s
invented definitions of “fair” and “reasonable” compensation.
The medical insurance literature on apology programs is replete
with examples of what those who have to pay claims believe to be
“fair,” followed by language indicating that their definitions
simply do not correspond with what our legal system has defined
as the appropriate measure of damages, assuming a plaintiff can
prove malpractice.162 Instead, the literature reflects an imagined
system of tort damages that delegitimizes the availability of noneconomic damages, and perhaps, even more expensive measures
of economic damages. This is not an article that argues about
whether the legal system currently assesses damages the “right”
way. Instead, it accepts that full and fair damages are as defined
by courts and applied by juries.163 Therefore, this article accepts
the commonly accepted and current legal definition of “fair” and
“reasonable” compensation, which requires that tort victims be
compensated with all of the economic and non-economic damages
sufficient to make the injured plaintiff “whole.”
Third, and finally, this Article did not argue that doctors are
the “bad guys.” Just the opposite: it is intended to expose the
actual motivation behind medical disclosure policies—insurers’
desire to keep more money for themselves and give less to
162 See, e.g., Steve S. Kraman, Proactive Reporting, Investigation, Disclosure, and
Remedying of Medical Errors Leads to Similar or Lower than Average Malpractice Claim
Costs, AHRQ HEALTH CARE INNOVATIONS EXCHANGE (last visited July 25, 2011),
http://innovations.ahrq.gov/content.aspx?id=2731 (“[After disclosure, Kentucky VA]
hospital representatives offer to provide corrective medical or surgical treatment, assist
the patient/family in filing for needed services associated with any disability resulting
from medical care, and/or present an offer of monetary compensation. The respective
attorneys negotiate to reach a fair settlement based on a reasonable calculation of loss.”);;
U. OF MICH. HEALTH SYS., supra note 159 (“If we have concluded that our care was
unreasonable, we say so—and we apologize. If our care caused an injury, we work with
the patient and his/her counsel to reach mutual agreement about a resolution. This
doesn’t always mean a settlement, but if it does, we compensate quickly and fairly.”).
163 See supra notes 138–148 and accompanying text (describing full and fair
compensation under the tort system).
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patients—and to suggest ways to reform the process to meet the
needs of improving doctor-patient communication while
providing injured patients with an appropriate, compassionate,
and fair opportunity to receive compensation in the event of an
unwanted outcome. Rather than demonize doctors, it is hoped
that medical providers will read this Article, recognize the
disservice that their insurers are asking them to commit against
their patients, and revolt against it. By allowing the legal
process to go forward after an apology, doctors can then know
that they are putting patients in the best position possible to
recover from a medical error.
Disclosure programs put in place by insurance companies
and self-insured hospitals put their own interests in front of both
patients and providers alike.
For example, consider the
guidelines provided to doctors by CRICO/RMF to its physicians
when an error occurs:
In cases that are clear-cut and where an objectively visible error has
occurred, apologies should be made. Some institutions refer to these
as “The Wrongs”: wrong patient; wrong digit/limb/organ; wrong
drug/dose/method of administration; wrong procedure, etc. If a doctor,
assisted by the institutional risk manager, can clearly determine that
the unanticipated outcome has been caused by one of these “wrongs”,
[sic] an immediate apology should be made. However, it should be
emphasized that physicians should not make this determination on
their own. They should immediately contact their risk manager, lay
out every known fact, and then let the risk manager serve as their
expert.164

The assertions are both remarkable and insulting to the
physicians expected to carry them out: it is CRICO/RMF’s
position that even if a doctor accidentally cuts off the wrong limb
of a patient, that doctor cannot determine if his or her act was an
error.
Can one seriously believe that CRICO/RMF’s risk
managers believe that they know better than a provider if they
have made an error? Instead, language like the above suggests
what insurers really want when dealing with their physicians:
control. When a doctor submits to the insurer’s control, in turn,
it allows the insurer to instruct the doctor on how to talk to their
patients to steer them away from seeking compensation for their
injuries. While no doctor wants a malpractice claim on his or her
record, it is also hard to imagine any doctor that pays for
malpractice insurance would want his or her injured patient to
be shortchanged by the insurer to whom they pay premiums (let
alone that the doctor that made the error would want to be the

164

CRICO’s Perspective, supra note 2.
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insurance company’s tool to convince the patient that their injury
should not be compensated).
Those that have to pay malpractice claims have a conflict of
interest with physicians: the risk manager’s obligation is to the
insurance company, whereas the physician’s obligation is to the
patient. Even those who have written strongly in favor of
apology programs, like Dr. Steve Kraman and Ginny Hamm, note
that this phenomenon is inherent to risk management. By their
definition, “risk management usually refers to self-protective
activities meant to prevent real or potential threats of financial
loss due to accident, injury, or medical malpractice. When a
malpractice claim is made against an institution in the private
sector, risk managers coordinate the defense against patients,
their dependents, and their attorneys.”165
When insurance companies, or the internal risk managers at
a hospital who are in league with the insurers, use their
influence over physicians to encourage apology as a means of
maximizing their own profits, they taint the physician’s
responsibility to the patient. Without corporate concerns about
compensating patients, insurance companies and risk managers
would not publish elaborate guidance to their doctors explaining
sophisticated policies about how to apologize.166 Doctors would
not need to seek approval of a risk manager before admitting an
error to a patient that has just suffered from a “never event” at
their hands.167 This Article seeks to cut doctors out of the
hypocrisy by allowing them to offer a sincere, no-strings-attached
apology after an act of malpractice that leaves the legal effects of
Kraman & Hamm, supra note 24, at 963 (emphasis omitted).
See, e.g., CRICO’s Perspective, supra note 2. See also MASS. COAL. FOR
THE PREVENTION OF MED. ERRORS, WHEN THINGS GO WRONG: RESPONDING TO
ADVERSE EVENTS 1 (2006), available at http://www.macoalition.org/documents/
respondingToAdverseEvents.pdf (providing advice regarding “The Patient and Family
Experience”;; “The Caregiver Experience”;; and “Management of the Event”);; Am. Soc’y for
Healthcare Risk Mgmt., Disclosure: What Works Now & What Can Work Even Better, 24
J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. 19 (2004) (“The next step in better communication with
patients”;; “Creating an effective patient communication polity”;; and “What works now
and what can work even better.”). Furthermore, a cottage industry of private companies
has sprung up offering guidance and seminars to physicians instructing exactly what to
say, when to say it, under what circumstances, and in what setting. These programs are
designed to minimize the possibility the disclosure might instigate, rather than prevent,
litigation. See, e.g., TRUOG ET AL., supra note 10; WOJCIESZAK, supra note 125; WOODS,
supra note 127.
167 Doctors deliver apologies, but they are trained to carefully plan their words in
concert with their risk manager. See, e.g., Disclosure, CRICO/RMF (last visited Sept. 27,
2011),
http://www.rmf.harvard.edu/education-interventions/materials-for-instructors/
disclosure/disclosure-support-materials.aspx. A “never event” is a term used by the
National Quality Forum (NQF) to describe particularly shocking medical errors (such as
wrong-site surgery) that should never occur. Never Events, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. (July 13, 2011), http://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=3.
165
166
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that to the insurance company to whom the doctor pays
premiums for just such a purpose.
The shame is that medical apology programs could be a
positive thing. Saving on psychological stress and anguish of the
patient and physician, lowering attorneys’ fees and litigation
costs, and lightening burdens on already overwhelmed court
systems are all laudable goals. Using power differentials and
taking advantage of harmed patients to increase profits are not.
Some commentators have argued that doctors are fiduciaries of
their patients, thus owing them the highest possible duty to
protect their interests.168 Some courts have even ruled as such.169
We should take seriously the idea that doctors owe their primary
allegiance to their patients; not just in making medical decisions,
but in any and all decisions relating to their relationship. In
their White Paper on disclosing malpractice, the Massachusetts
Coalition for the Protection of Medical Errors suggested that,
when approaching these issues, it should be done from the
patient’s point of view.170 They asked, “What would I want if I
were harmed by my treatment?” and “[W]hat is the right thing to
do?”171
This Article stands for that idea that doing the “right thing”
for patients requires something more than convincing them not
to seek compensation through litigation for injuries caused by
negligent errors. Adults can, and should, be expected to make
serious decisions about whether to pursue legal claims that they
are entitled to make. If an injured patient, after soberly
considering the options, decides not to pursue a claim, then that
is a perfectly acceptable result. However, in situations where a
168 See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts:
Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491,
526 (2009) (suggesting physicians’ fiduciary duties obligate them to avoid effects of
medical manufacturers’ marketing). See also Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M.
Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of Physicians to “Just Say No” if an
“Informed” Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L.
REV. 335, 374 (2009) (suggesting physicians’ fiduciary duty includes obligation to deny
patients’ requests for medically unnecessary services). As one commentator noted, “[s]o
long as doctors continue to claim the mantle of professional and not mere business
contractor, they are privileged by the trust invested in them by patients, and also
burdened by the duty of loyalty and devotion to patient welfare above their own that their
status as fiduciaries entails.” Charity Scott, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers as Healers, 29
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 331, 350–51 (2008).
169 See, e.g., Emmet v. E. Dispensary and Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (finding a fiduciary relationship exists between physicians and patients); Hahn v.
Mirda, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 532 (2007) (recognizing California courts have “repeatedly”
recognized the physician/patient relationship as a fiduciary one); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612
P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (explaining that the doctrine of informed consent springs from
the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient).
170 MASS. COAL. FOR THE PREVENTION OF MED. ERRORS, supra note 137, at 3.
171 Id.
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person is injured and scared, the medical industry should find
ways to give them an opportunity to make educated decisions
and not take advantage of their weakened state.

